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GUBERNATORIAL	  POWER	  AND	  	  
THE	  NATIONALIZATION	  OF	  STATE	  POLITICS	  
Paul	  Nolette	  *	  
SALADIN	   M.	   AMBAR,	   HOW	   GOVERNORS	   BUILT	   THE	   MODERN	   AMERICAN	   PRESIDENCY	  (2012).	  Pp.	  200.	  Hardcover	  $55.00.	  	   THAD	  KOUSSER	  &	   JUSTIN	  H.	  PHILLIPS,	  THE	  POWER	  OF	  AMERICAN	  GOVERNORS:	  WINNING	  ON	  BUDGETS	  AND	  LOSING	  ON	  POLICY	  (2012).	  Pp.	  296.	  Hardcover	  $94.00.	  	  Governors,	  the	  late	  Alan	  Rosenthal	  argued,	  have	  the	  “best	  job	  in	  politics.”1	  For	  political	  entrepreneurs	  looking	  to	  influence	  policy	  and	  establish	  a	  national	  reputa-­‐tion,	   there	  appear	   few	  better	  venues	   than	   the	  governorship	   to	  do	  so.	   In	  my	  home	  state	  of	  Wisconsin,	   for	  example,	  Governor	  Scott	  Walker	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  possible	  candidate	  for	  the	  2016	  Republican	  presidential	  nomination	  after	  winning	  on	  sever-­‐al	  controversial	  policy	  proposals	  and	  surviving	  a	  subsequent	  recall	  election.2	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  ideological	  divide,	  Democratic	  governors	  such	  as	  Maryland’s	  Mar-­‐tin	  O’Malley	  and	  New	  York’s	  Andrew	  Cuomo	  have	  achieved	  liberal	  policy	  successes,	  catapulting	   them	   into	   the	   national	   limelight.3	   Meanwhile,	   parties	   and	   interest	  groups	  devote	  more	  resources	  than	  ever	  to	   influence	  gubernatorial	  races.	   In	  2010	  alone,	  when	   thirty-­‐seven	   governors’	   races	  were	   decided	   across	   the	  United	   States,	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  gubernatorial	  elections	  exceeded	  $920	  million.4	  These	  important	  political	  actors	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  two	  impressive	  new	  books	  that	   use	   different	   approaches	   to	   examine	   governors’	   power	   and	   influence.	   In	   his	  book,	  How	  Governors	  Built	   the	  Modern	  American	  Presidency,	   Saladin	  Ambar	  devel-­‐ops	  a	  rich	  historical	  narrative	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  powerful	  Progressive	  Era	   governors	   influenced	   the	   establishment	  of	   the	  modern	  American	  presidency.5	  
                                                            	   *	   Assistant	  Professor	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Marquette	  University.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   ALAN	  ROSENTHAL,	  THE	  BEST	  JOB	  IN	  POLITICS:	  EXPLORING	  HOW	  GOVERNORS	  SUCCEED	  AS	  POLICY	  LEADERS	  8	  (2013).	  	   2.	  	   Beth	  Reinhard,	  Is	  Scott	  Walker	  the	  GOP's	  Sleeper	  Presidential	  Candidate?,	  NAT’L	   J.	   (June	  19,	  2013,	  11:18	   AM),	   	   http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/is-­‐scott-­‐walker-­‐the-­‐gop-­‐s-­‐sleeper-­‐presidential-­‐candidate-­‐20130617.	  	  	   3.	  	   See	  Raymond	  Hernandez,	  For	  Ambitious	  Governor,	  a	  Clinton	  Stands	  in	  the	  Way,	  N.Y.	  TIMES	  (Sept.	  21,	  2012),	   http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/nyregion/cuomos-­‐presidential-­‐dreams-­‐and-­‐a-­‐clinton-­‐in-­‐the-­‐way.html?;	   James	   Hohmann,	  Martin	   O'Malley	   Outlines	   '16	   Candidacy,	   POLITICO	   (Aug.	   3,	   2013,	   7:56	  PM),	  http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/martin-­‐omalley-­‐2016-­‐95165.html.	  	  	   4.	  	   Thad	  Beyle,	  Gubernatorial	  Elections,	  Campaign	  Costs,	  and	  Winning	  Governors,	   in	  THE	  BOOK	  OF	  THE	  STATES	  147	  (2013).	  	   5.	  	   SALADIN	  M.	  AMBAR,	  HOW	  GOVERNORS	  BUILT	  THE	  MODERN	  AMERICAN	  PRESIDENCY	  8	  (2012).	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Thad	  Kousser	  and	  Justin	  H.	  Phillips’s	  The	  Power	  of	  American	  Governors:	  Winning	  on	  
Budgets	  and	  Losing	  on	  Policy	  employs	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  methods	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  con-­‐ditions	   under	   which	   contemporary	   governors	   are	   empowered	   and	   constrained.6	  While	   both	   books	   focus	   specifically	   on	   governors,	   both	   correctly	   emphasize	   that	  studying	  governors	  can	  reveal	   insights	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  executive	  power	  more	  broadly.	  Ambar	   is	  more	   explicit	   in	   this	   regard,	   framing	  his	  narrative	  with	   a	   claim	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  chief	  executives’	  power	  in	  the	  states	  helped	  influence	  the	  shape	  of	   executive	   power	   on	   the	   national	   level.7	   While	   the	   connection	   is	   more	   implicit	  throughout	  Kousser	  and	  Phillips’s	  work,	  one	  of	  the	  authors’	  stated	  goals	   is	  to	  con-­‐vince	  scholars	  to	  “examine	  governors	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  research	  agenda	  on	  execu-­‐tive	  power.”8	  In	   this	   sense,	   both	   books	   are	   part	   of	   a	  welcome	   trend	   emphasizing	   that	   the	  study	   of	   the	   American	   states	   can	   teach	   us	   much	   about	   broader	   developments	   in	  American	   politics.	   This	   is	   partly	   because,	   as	   Sanford	   Levinson	   remarked	   in	   refer-­‐ence	   to	   America’s	   fifty	   state	   constitutions,	   the	   states	   contain	   a	   “treasure	   trove	   of	  material	   in	   front	  of	  our	  very	  eyes,”	  allowing	  scholars	   to	  examine	  greater	  variation	  than	   focusing	   on	   national	   politics	   alone.9	   As	  Kousser	   and	   Phillips	   similarly	   put	   it,	  American	   federalism	  provides	  a	   “great	   research	  design	  opportunity”	   that	   scholars	  and	  students	  of	  national	  politics	  ought	  not	  to	  ignore.10	  More	  fundamentally,	  the	  scholarly	  separation	  of	  “state”	  and	  “national”	  politics	  has	  become	  increasingly	  untenable	  for	  another	  reason.	  Politics	  since	  the	  New	  Deal,	  as	   E.E.	   Schattschneider	   noted,	   has	   become	   increasingly	   nationalized	   as	   the	   issues	  political	  parties	  contested	  has	  shifted	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  national	  scale.11	  The	  na-­‐tionalization	  of	  state	  politics	  has	  become	  even	  more	  apparent	  in	  the	  decades	  since	  Schattschneider	  made	   this	   argument	   in	   1960.	   Several	   scholars,	   for	   example,	   have	  argued	   that	   previously	   sharp	   cultural	   differences	   across	   the	   states	   have	   since	   re-­‐ceded.12	  New	   federal	   social	  policies	  adopted	   in	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  explicitly	   in-­‐corporated	  the	  states	  into	  the	  operation	  of	  federal	  programs,	  granting	  state	  actors	  both	  greater	  interest	  and	  ability	  to	  help	  shape	  national	  policy.13	  National	  advocacy	  
                                                            	   6.	  	   THAD	  KOUSSER	  &	   JUSTIN	  H.	   PHILLIPS,	   THE	  POWER	  OF	  AMERICAN	  GOVERNORS:	  WINNING	  ON	  BUDGETS	   AND	  LOSING	  ON	  POLICY	  22-­‐25	  (2012).	  	   7.	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  8.	  	   8.	   KOUSSER	  &	  PHILLIPS,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  8.	  	   9.	  	   Sanford	  Levinson,	  America's	   “Other	  Constitutions”:	  The	   Importance	  of	   State	  Constitutions	   for	  Our	  
Law	  and	  Politics,	  45	  TULSA	  L.	  REV.	  813,	  816	  (2011).	  	   10.	  	   KOUSSER	  &	  PHILLIPS,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  8.	  	   11.	  	   E.E.	   SCHATTSCHNEIDER,	   THE	   SEMISOVEREIGN	   PEOPLE:	   A	   REALIST'S	   VIEW	   OF	   DEMOCRACY	   IN	   AMERICA	   89	  (1960).	  	   12.	  	   E.g.,	  MALCOLM	  M.	  FEELEY	  &	  EDWARD	  RUBIN,	  FEDERALISM:	  POLITICAL	   IDENTITY	  AND	  TRAGIC	  COMPROMISE	  152	  (2008);	  ROBERT	  A.	  SCHAPIRO,	  POLYPHONIC	  FEDERALISM:	  TOWARD	  THE	  PROTECTION	  OF	  FUNDAMENTAL	  RIGHTS	  5	   (2009);	   Mark	   Tushnet,	   Federalism	   as	   a	   Cure	   for	   Democracy's	   Discontent?,	   in	   DEBATING	   DEMOCRACY'S	  DISCONTENT:	  ESSAYS	  ON	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS,	  LAW,	  AND	  PUBLIC	  PHILOSOPHY	  307,	  313	  (Anita	  L.	  Allen	  &	  Milton	  C.	  Regan,	  Jr.	  eds.,	  1998).	  	   13.	  	   This	  was	  particularly	  true	  of	  health	  care	  and	  environmental	  policy,	  which	  Congress	  built	  upon	  a	  frame	  of	   cooperative	   federalism	   in	  which	   states	   and	   the	   federal	   government	   shared	   responsibility	   for	  policy	  implementation.	  See	   John	  P.	  Dwyer,	  The	  Practice	  of	  Federalism	  Under	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act,	  54	  MD.	  L.	  REV.	   1183,	   1197-­‐98	   (1995)	   (describing	   the	   operation	   of	   cooperative	   federalism	   in	   American	   environ-­‐mental	   policy);	  Nicole	  Huberfeld,	   Federalizing	  Medicaid,	   14	  U.	   PA.	   J.	   CONST.	   L.	   431,	   436-­‐53	   (2011)	   (de-­‐scribing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  federal-­‐state	  partnership	  in	  the	  Medicaid	  program).	  
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/5
2013]	   GUBERNATORIAL	  POWER	   281	  
groups,	   such	   as	   the	   conservative	   American	   Legislative	   Exchange	   Council,	   have	  looked	  to	  the	  states	  as	  opportunity	  points	  to	  spread	  policy	  ideas	  across	  the	  nation	  in	  a	  coordinated	  fashion.14	  These	  developments	  have	  meant	  that	  state	  politics	  have	  increasingly	  become	  an	  extension	  of	   larger	  national	  policy	  battles.	  This	  makes	   the	   study	  of	   “state	  poli-­‐tics”	  a	  practical	  necessity	  for	  anyone	  interested	  in	  understanding	  national	  politics.	  Given	   that	   governors	   increasingly	   seek	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   broader	   national	   debate	  about	  policy—with	  the	  helpful	  side	  benefit,	  of	  course,	  of	  introducing	  themselves	  to	  a	   national	   audience—books	   such	   as	   Ambar’s	   and	   Kousser	   and	   Phillips’s	   contain	  much	  of	  interest	  even	  to	  those	  outside	  the	  subfield	  of	  state	  politics.	  As	  mentioned	   earlier,	  Ambar’s	   book	   is	   explicit	   about	   linking	   together	  devel-­‐opments	  in	  state	  and	  national	  politics.15	  His	  central	  claim	  is	  that	  governors	  “built	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  and	   theories	   that	  ultimately	   shaped	  presidential	  behavior	  and,	   in-­‐deed,	   made	   acceptable	   a	   broad	   executive-­‐centered	   approach	   to	   governance	   in	  America.”16	  Governors	  as	  early	  as	  Samuel	  Tilden	  and	  Rutherford	  B.	  Hayes,	  who	  ran	  against	  one	  another	  in	  the	  1876	  presidential	  race,	  pursued	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  executive	  power	  that	  included	  a	  deep	  belief	  in	  executive-­‐centered	  government	  and	  a	  willingness	   to	  push	   the	  envelope	  on	  executive	  power.17	   Subsequent	  Progressive	  Era	  governors	  developed	   this	  understanding,	  becoming	  more	  aggressive	   in	   taking	  on	   new	   leadership	   roles	  within	   their	   parties	   and	   institutionalizing	  more	   effective	  press	  and	  media	  relations.18	  As	  governors	  began	  developing	  a	  more	  robust	  vision	  of	  their	  executive	  role,	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  “little	  more	  than	  ciphers,”	  as	  James	  Madi-­‐son	  described	  early	  American	  governors,	  but	  instead	  powerful	  and	  nationally	  influ-­‐ential	  actors.19	  Ambar	   claims	   that	   governors’	   national	   influence	   stemmed	   from	   their	   influ-­‐ence	  on	  the	  way	  modern	  presidents	  understood	  executive	  power.20	  Part	  of	  this	  in-­‐fluence	  was	   related	   to	   the	   sheer	   number	   of	   governors	   during	   the	   late	   nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  who	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  White	  House.21	  Between	  Hayes	  and	  Franklin	  Roosevelt,	  “presidents	  were	  twice	  as	  likely	  .	  .	   .	  to	  have	  had	  prior	  elec-­‐tive	  executive	  experience”	  as	  earlier	  presidents	  from	  Washington	  to	  Grant.22	  While	  in	  national	  office,	  several	  of	  these	  governor-­‐presidents	  relied	  upon	  aggressive	  uses	  of	  executive	  power	   that	   they	  had	  already	  used	   in	   their	  governorships,	   such	  as	  ex-­‐tensive	  use	  of	  the	  veto	  and	  challenges	  to	  powerful	  legislators’	  claims	  to	  party	  lead-­‐ership.23	  Gubernatorial	  actions	  also	  served	  as	  inspiration	  for	  presidents	  and	  fellow	  
                                                            	   14.	  	   Mike	  McIntire,	  Conservative	  Nonprofit	  Acts	  as	  Stealth	  Business	  Lobbyist,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Apr.	  21,	  2012,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-­‐a-­‐tax-­‐exempt-­‐group-­‐mixes-­‐legislators-­‐and-­‐lobbyists.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.	  	  	   15.	  	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  8.	  	   16.	  	   	  Id.	  	  	   17.	  	   Id.	  at	  8-­‐9.	  	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	  	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  22.	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  8.	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  	  	   22.	  	   Id.	  	  	   23.	  	   Id.	  at	  10-­‐11.	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governors,	   as	   when	   President	   Woodrow	   Wilson	   borrowed	   Wisconsin	   Governor	  Robert	  La	  Follette’s	  symbolic	  gesture	  of	  communicating	  his	  annual	  message	  in	  per-­‐son	  directly	  to	  the	  legislature.24	  The	   book’s	   case	   studies	   provide	   a	   rich	   account	   of	   the	   burgeoning	   power	   of	  governors	   throughout	   the	  Progressive	  Era.	  While	  other	  governors	   such	  as	  La	  Fol-­‐lette	  and	  Grover	  Cleveland	  receive	  attention,	  the	  three	  central	  case	  studies	  focus	  on	  the	  New	  York	  governorships	  of	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  and	  Franklin	  Roosevelt,	  as	  well	  as	  Woodrow	  Wilson’s	  tenure	  as	  New	  Jersey’s	  chief	  executive.	  The	  historical	  narra-­‐tive	   traces	   how	   these	   governors	   expanded	   executive	   power	   through	   encounters	  such	   as	  Wilson’s	   intraparty	   fight	  with	  New	   Jersey	  Democratic	   boss	   James	   Smith25	  and	  Theodore	  Roosevelt’s	  shepherding	  the	  Ford	  franchise	  tax	  bill	  through	  the	  New	  York	  legislature.26	  Students	  and	  scholars	  will	  learn	  much	  from	  the	  rich	  case	  studies	  in	   this	   book,	   particularly	   since	   the	   narratives	   Ambar	   highlights	   are	   so	   frequently	  overlooked	  relative	  to	  these	  policy	  entrepreneurs'	  later	  accomplishments	  as	  presi-­‐dents.	  Beyond	  his	   interesting	  historical	  narratives,	   one	  of	   the	   strengths	  of	  Ambar’s	  book	  is	  his	  weaving	  of	  broader	  political	  trends	  in	  American	  politics	  into	  his	  study	  of	  the	  growth	  of	  gubernatorial	  influence.	  He	  discusses	  how	  the	  emergence	  of	  “a	  society	  without	  a	  core”27	  during	   the	  period	  after	  Reconstruction,	  driven	   in	  part	  by	   the	  al-­‐ienating	   effects	   of	   rapid	   industrialization,	   led	   to	   new	   calls	   for	   plebiscitary	   leader-­‐ship.28	  Skilled	  governors	  took	  advantage	  of	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  by	  fashioning	  them-­‐selves	  as	  tribunes	  of	  the	  people,	  much	  as	  modern	  presidents	  began	  to	  do	  during	  this	  period.29	  By	  showing	  that	  governors	  were	  expanding	  executive	  power	  even	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Era,	  Ambar	  provides	  a	  convincing	  retort	  to	  the	  sugges-­‐tion,	  made	  most	  famously	  by	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  in	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency,	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  presidential	  power	   in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  was	  primarily	  a	  product	  of	   the	  president’s	  wartime	  and	   foreign	  policy	  powers.30	   Instead,	  Ambar	   illustrates	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  executive	  influence	  began	  well	  before	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  presidents’	  wide	  claims	  of	  wartime	  powers.	  My	  intuition	  is	  that	  Ambar’s	  claims	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  gubernatorial	  pow-­‐er	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  presidency	  are	  largely	  correct.	  Overall,	  how-­‐ever,	  the	  book	  might	  have	  done	  a	  bit	  more	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  bold	  claim	  of	  its	  title.	  Most	  importantly,	  while	  Ambar	  documents	  important	  changes	  in	  executive	  leader-­‐ship	  occurring	  on	  both	  the	  state	  and	  national	  level	  during	  the	  Progressive	  Era,	  it	  is	  not	   clear	  whether	   the	   changes	   on	   the	   national	   level	   resulted	   from,	   as	   opposed	   to	  simply	   being	   contemporaneous	  with,	   developments	   on	   the	   state	   level.	  Would	   the	  modern	  presidency	  have	  failed	  to	  emerge	  without	  the	  actions	  of	  innovative	  gover-­‐nors	  on	  the	  state	  level?	  
                                                            	   24.	  	   Id.	  at	  39.	  	   25.	  	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  87-­‐93.	  	   26.	  	   Id.	  at	  60-­‐63.	  	   27.	  	   ROBERT	  H.	  WIEBE,	  THE	  SEARCH	  FOR	  ORDER,	  1877-­‐1920,	  at	  12	  (1967).	  	   28.	  	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  21-­‐23.	  	   29.	  	   Id.	  at	  23.	  	   30.	  	   ARTHUR	  M.	  SCHLESINGER,	  JR.,	  THE	  IMPERIAL	  PRESIDENCY	  viii-­‐ix	  (1973).	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Ambar’s	   central	   claim	   appears	   predicated	   on	   this	   being	   true.	   Yet	   it	   seems	  plausible	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  modern	  presidency	  relied	  not	  on	  a	  “bottom-­‐up	  fed-­‐eralism”	  in	  which	  new	  ideas	  diffused	  from	  the	  states	  to	  the	  national	  level,	  but	  rather	  from	   broader	   trends	   that	   simultaneously	   affected	   executive	   leadership	   across	   all	  levels	  of	  government.	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  it	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  say	  that	  what	  real-­‐ly	  built	  the	  modern	  American	  presidency	  was	  the	  same	  public	  demand	  for	  “[e]nergy	  in	   the	   executive”31	   everywhere	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   counter	   inaction	   in	   other	  branches	  of	  government.	  This	   interpretation	  seems	  the	  most	   likely	  when	  one	  con-­‐siders	  other	  developments	  on	  the	  state	  level	  at	  the	  time.	  Other	  independently	  elect-­‐ed	  state-­‐level	  executives	  faced	  intense	  public	  pressure	  to	  confront	  emerging	  issues	  during	  the	  Progressive	  Era,	  such	  as	  the	  rise	  of	  corporate	  trusts,	  and	  many	  used	  their	  offices	   in	   innovative	  ways	   to	   react	   to	   public	   demand.32	   Ambar	   himself	   notes	   how	  “the	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  new	  American	  executive	  were	  evident	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  ven-­‐ues,”	   providing	   the	   example	   of	   newly	   elected	   New	   York	   City	   Mayor	   Robert	   Van	  Wyck’s	  “invocation	  of	  an	  executive	  zeitgeist”	  in	  1898.33	  Ambar	   provides	   several	   tantalizing	   hints	   of	   the	   unique	   influence	   governors	  had	   on	   the	   development	   of	  modern	   presidents’	   expansive	   claims	   of	   executive	   au-­‐thority.	  For	  example,	  he	  presents	  evidence	  that	  “though	  governor-­‐presidents	  make	  up	  less	  than	  40	  percent	  of	  all	  presidents,	  they	  account	  for	  a	  surprising	  64	  percent	  of	  all	   presidential	   vetoes.”34	   This	   suggests	   that	   governor-­‐presidents	   did	   learn	   from	  their	  previous	  experience	  as	  their	  states’	  chief	  executives.	  He	  also	  provides	  a	  good	  discussion	   of	   how	   Herbert	   Croly,	   whose	   The	   Promise	   of	   American	   Life35	   is	   often	  credited	   with	   influencing	   Theodore	   Roosevelt,	   himself	   “drew	   inspiration	   for	   his	  model	   of	   executive	   politics	   from	   America’s	   early	   twentieth-­‐century	   governors.”36	  Gubernatorial	   actions	   during	   this	   time	   helped	   support	   Croly’s	   argument	   that	   his	  conception	  of	  executive	  authority	  already	  had	  a	  lineage	  in	  American	  politics.37	  While	   these	  aspects	  of	  Ambar’s	  narrative	  help	  build	   the	  case	   that	  something	  was	  special	   about	  Progressive	  Era	  governors,	  Ambar	  might	  have	  bolstered	  his	  ar-­‐gument	  about	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   gubernatorial	   influence	  by	   closely	   examining	   the	  presidencies	   of	   those	   without	   previous	   experience	   as	   governors.	   Did	   presidents	  with	  different	  backgrounds,	   such	  as	  Benjamin	  Harrison	  and	  William	  Howard	  Taft,	  use	   their	   executive	   power	   in	   a	   fundamentally	   different	   way	   than	   the	   governor-­‐presidents?	  Did	  Herbert	  Hoover	  have	  a	  more	  limited	  conception	  of	  executive	  power	  because	  he	  did	  not	  previously	   serve	  as	   governor?	  Given	   the	   centrality	  of	  Ambar’s	  
                                                            	   31.	  	   	  THE	  FEDERALIST	  NO.	  70,	  at	  423	  (Alexander	  Hamilton)	  (Clinton	  Rossiter	  ed.,	  1961).	  	   32.	  	   See	  generally	  Paul	  Nolette,	  Litigating	  the	  “Public	  Interest”	  in	  the	  Gilded	  Age:	  Common	  Law	  Business	  
Regulation	  by	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  State	  Attorneys	  General,	  44	  POLITY	  373	  (2012)	  (discussing	   the	  role	  of	  state	  attorneys	  general	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  and	  how	  they	  pursued	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  by	  employing	  public	  nuisance	  and	  quo	  warranto	  litigation	  against	  business-­‐es).	  	   33.	  	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  56.	  	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  34-­‐35.	  	   35.	  	   See	  HERBERT	  DAVID	  CROLY,	  THE	  PROMISE	  OF	  AMERICAN	  LIFE	  (1909).	  	   36.	  	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  50.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  51.	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argument	   that	   “presidential	   background	   matters,”38	   consideration	   of	   how	   non-­‐governor	  presidents	  treated	  the	  executive	  power	  at	  their	  disposal	  would	  be	  a	  par-­‐ticularly	  fruitful	  inquiry.	  It	  would	  have	  also	  been	  beneficial	  to	  get	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  the	  relative	  influ-­‐ence	  of	  formal	  versus	  informal	  sources	  of	  power	  on	  the	  expansion	  of	  gubernatorial	  authority.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  given	  that	  informal	  power	  is	  a	  cornerstone	  of	   the	  modern	  presidency.39	  At	  several	  points	   in	   the	  narrative,	  Ambar	  emphasizes	  the	   importance	  of	   formal	   gubernatorial	   powers	   contained	   in	   state	   constitutions.40	  Early	  on,	  for	  example,	  he	  suggests	  that	  states	  often	  “took	  the	  lead	  in	  recasting	  legis-­‐lative-­‐executive	   relations”	   because	   state	   constitutions	  were	   easier	   to	   amend	   than	  the	  federal	  constitution.41	  “Hudson	  Progressives”	  play	  such	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  his	  nar-­‐rative	  partly	  because	  New	  York	  governors	   like	  Samuel	  Tilden	  had	  much	  more	  for-­‐mal	   authority	   than	   governors	   in	   other	   states,42	   and	   New	   Jersey’s	   Constitution	  granted	  its	  chief	  executives,	  such	  as	  Woodrow	  Wilson,	  more	  power	  relative	  to	  those	  elsewhere.43	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  these	  formal	  constitutional	  powers	  really	  mattered	  in	  the	   development	   of	   new	   conceptions	   of	   executive	   authority,	   however.	   Ambar	   de-­‐scribes	  many	  other	   instances	  of	   governors	   relying	  upon	  more	   informal	   resources,	  such	  as	  patronage	  opportunities,	  media	  influence,	  and	  informal	  claims	  of	  authority,	  to	  build	  executive	  power.44	  Perhaps	  most	  strikingly,	  as	  Ambar	  recounts,	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  announced	  during	  his	  campaign	   for	  governor	   that	  he	  would	  act	  as	   “an	  un-­‐constitutional	   Governor”	   by	   using	   his	   informal	   executive	   powers	   to	   the	   fullest.45	  Ambar	  might	  have	  probed	  deeper	  to	  examine	  the	  sources	  of	  gubernatorial	  authori-­‐ty,	  which	  could	  strengthen	  his	  argument	  that	  there	  really	  was	  something	  distinctive	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  American	  governors.46	  In	  other	  words,	  did	  governors	  rely	  up-­‐on	  distinct	  characteristics	  of	   their	  offices	  to	  develop	  new	  conceptions	  of	  executive	  authority,	  or	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  executive	  authority	  so	  open-­‐ended	  that	  political	  entre-­‐preneurs	  in	  any	  executive	  office	  will	  find	  ways	  to	  push	  their	  prerogative	  as	  far	  as	  it	  will	  go?	  While	  these	  points	  might	  have	  been	  fleshed	  out	  a	  bit	  more,	  this	  book	  is	  an	  im-­‐portant	   advance	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   executive	   power.	   Students	   and	   scholars	  alike	  will	  find	  it	  a	  good	  read	  brimming	  with	  many	  insights	  and	  rich	  historical	  detail.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  Ambar’s	  book	  serves	  as	  a	  fine	  addition	  to	  recent	  scholar-­‐ly	   trends	  seeking	  to	  break	  down	  the	  too-­‐sharp	  distinction	  between	  “state	  politics”	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  “national	  politics”	  on	  the	  other.	  Much	  like	  How	  Governors	  Built	  the	  Modern	  American	  Presidency,	  Kousser	  and	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  POLITICS	  OF	  LEADERSHIP	  179	  (1960).	  	   40.	  	   AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  35,	  54,	  76.	  	  	   41.	  	   Id.at	  2.	  	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  29-­‐30.	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  76.	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	  	   45.	  	   Id.	  at	  80.	  	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  6-­‐7.	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Phillips’s	  The	  Power	  of	  American	  Governors	  portrays	  governors	  as	  influential	  politi-­‐cal	   actors.	   Their	   book	   focuses	   on	   governors	   in	   the	   contemporary	   context,	   ambi-­‐tiously	   tackling	   several	   questions	   pertaining	   to	   the	   power	   of	   modern	   governors.	  How	   do	   governors,	  who	   lack	   any	   formal	   constitutional	   power	   to	   craft	   legislation,	  nevertheless	  respond	  to	  public	  demands	  for	  policy	  leadership?47	  Under	  what	  condi-­‐tions	  are	  governors	  most	  likely	  to	  succeed	  and	  when	  are	  they	  most	  likely	  to	  fail?48	  One	   of	   the	   book’s	   central	   findings	   is	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   other	   scholarly	   accounts	  that	  emphasize	  gubernatorial	  weakness	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  many	  formal	  constraints	  on	  governors,	  “governors	  do	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  shaping	  state	  fiscal	  and	  policy	  choic-­‐es.”49	  While	  the	  link	  between	  state	  and	  national	  politics	  is	  not	  as	  explicit	  in	  this	  book	  as	  in	  Ambar’s,	  the	  authors	  rightly	  claim	  that	  the	  study	  of	  governors	  can	  help	  reveal	  much	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  executive	  power.50	  Perhaps	  most	  centrally,	  they	  illustrate	  the	  relative	   irrelevance	  of	   formal	  executive	  authority	  as	  compared	   to	  other	  deter-­‐minants	   of	   executive	   power.	  While	   a	   common	   scholarly	   practice	   is	   to	   distinguish	  “strong	  governors”	  and	  “weak	  governors”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  formal	  powers	  granted	  to	  governors	  by	   their	   state	   constitutions,	  Kousser	   and	  Phillips	  demonstrate	   that	   this	  distinction	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  most	  important	  variations	  in	  gubernatorial	  power.51	  Instead,	   the	   authors	   “find	   that	   the	   power	   of	   chief	   executives	   often	   depends	  more	  on	  each	  governor’s	  political	  circumstances	  and	  resources	  than	  on	  the	  formal	  powers	  delegated	  by	  the	  state	  constitution.”52	  The	  structure	  of	  institutions	  matters	  for	  executive	  power—but	  not	   in	  the	  way	  you	  might	  think.	   In	  fact,	   the	  authors	  find	  that	   “one	  of	   the	  strongest	  determinants	  of	  gubernatorial	  power	   lies	  outside	  of	   the	  executive	   branch	   altogether—the	   professionalization	   of	   the	   legislature.”53	   Profes-­‐sional	  legislatures,	  which	  meet	  full-­‐time	  and	  consist	  of	  members	  whose	  position	  in	  the	  legislature	  is	  a	  full-­‐time	  job,	  are	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  considerable	  political	  bargain-­‐ing	  with	  the	  governor.	  By	  contrast,	  part-­‐time	  citizen	  legislators	  can	  literally	  not	  af-­‐ford	  to	  endure	  multiple	  rounds	  of	  negotiations	  with	  the	  governor,	  since	  most	  have	  second	   jobs	   to	   which	   they	   must	   return	   at	   the	   conclusion	   of	   their	   (often	   sharply	  time-­‐limited)	  legislative	  sessions.	  Kousser	  and	  Phillips	  find	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  legisla-­‐tive	  patience	  on	  the	  part	  of	  non-­‐professionalized	  legislatures	  empowers	  the	  gover-­‐nor	  in	  negotiations,	  particularly	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  budget	  policy.54	  While	  citizen	  leg-­‐islatures	   might	   retain	   some	   romantic	   appeal	   by	   providing	   a	   “people’s	   check”55	  against	  governors	  and	  their	  professional	  staffs,	  their	  continued	  existence	  in	  several	  jurisdictions	  actually	  serves	  to	  empower	  the	  governor.56	  
                                                            	   47.	  	   KOUSSER	  &	  PHILLIPS,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  2.	  	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	  	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  19.	  	  	   50.	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  at	  254.	  	  	   52.	  	   Id.	  at	  24.	  	  	   53.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	  	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  226-­‐33.	  	   55.	  	   Id.	  at	  220.	  	   56.	  	   As	   the	   authors	   recount,	   this	   “people’s	   check”	   argument	  was	   one	   of	   the	   ultimately	   unsuccessful	  arguments	  against	  legislative	  professionalization	  in	  California	  during	  the	  1960s.	  Id.	  at	  219-­‐20.	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This	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   gubernatorial	   success	   is	   entirely	   reliant	   on	  structure	  outside	  of	   the	  governor’s	  control.	  Governors	  have	  agency,	  and	  how	  they	  use	   it	   can	   help	   determine	   their	   ultimate	   success.	   Aspiring	   governors	   should	   take	  note	   of	   the	   authors’	   finding	   that	   a	   key	   determinant	   of	   success	   is	   to	   begin	  with	   a	  manageable	   agenda.57	  While	   public	   demands	   for	   policy	   leadership	   and	   the	   gover-­‐nor’s	   own	   ambitions	   may	   tempt	   a	   newly	   elected	   governor	   to	   seek	   many	   policy	  goals,	  the	  authors	  find	  that	  governors	  who	  limit	  the	  size	  of	  their	  agendas	  to	  only	  a	  few	  key	  items	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  achieve	  them.58	  Further,	  and	  probably	  not	  surpris-­‐ingly,	  governors	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  temper	  the	  ideological	  tenor	  of	  their	  policy	  pro-­‐posals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed.59	  By	  contrast,	  governors	  who	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	   large	   “position-­‐taking	   bonus”	   by	   pursuing	  more	   ideological	   proposals—such	   as	  governors	  with	   an	   eye	   to	   the	  White	  House—are	   less	   likely	   to	   achieve	   policy	   suc-­‐cess.60	  Among	   the	   book’s	   many	   strengths	   is	   its	   reliance	   on	   a	   remarkable	   array	   of	  methods	   to	  probe	   the	  extent	  of	  gubernatorial	  power.	  Throughout	   the	   text,	   the	  au-­‐thors	  employ	  game	  theory,	  quantitative	  analysis,	  case	  studies,	  and	  extensive	  inter-­‐views	  with	  major	  statehouse	  players	  from	  various	  states.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  their	  anal-­‐ysis	  are	  two	  original	  datasets,	  one	  of	  which	  includes	  the	  fates	  of	  over	  one	  thousand	  policy	  and	  budget	  proposals	  made	  by	  several	  governors	   in	   their	  State	  of	   the	  State	  addresses,	  and	  a	  second	  that	  includes	  governors’	  budget	  proposals	  and	  final	  budget	  outcomes	  across	  twenty-­‐one	  fiscal	  years.61	  This	  data,	  along	  with	  the	  authors’	  com-­‐mand	  of	  sophisticated	  methods,	  enables	  Kousser	  and	  Phillips	  to	  make	  considerable	  advances	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  gubernatorial	  power.	  To	   be	   sure,	   some	   of	   the	   authors’	   findings	   are	   not	   entirely	   surprising.	   Few	  readers	   will	   be	   shocked	   to	   learn	   that	   governors	   tend	   to	   be	   less	   successful	   when	  members	  of	  the	  opposite	  party	  control	  the	  legislature,	  or	  that	  the	  largest	  factor	  con-­‐tributing	  to	  the	  ideological	  tilt	  of	  a	  governor’s	  overall	  agenda	  is	  the	  party	  in	  which	  the	  governor	  is	  a	  member.62	  Similarly,	  while	  the	  authors’	  discussion	  of	  the	  line-­‐item	  veto	  is	  quite	  interesting,	  it	  largely	  confirms	  earlier	  research	  in	  finding	  that	  the	  line-­‐item	  veto	  does	  not	  significantly	  increase	  gubernatorial	  power.63	  This	   is	   emphatically	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   readers	  will	   fail	   to	   learn	   any-­‐thing	   new	   from	   this	   book.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   the	   authors’	   reliance	   on	   such	   a	   wide	  range	  of	  data	  reveals	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  interest	  to	  students	  and	  scholars.	  Perhaps	  the	  authors’	  most	  important	  finding	  is	  that	  “critically	  different	  dynamics	  drive	  bargain-­‐ing	  over	  the	  budget	  and	  over	  policy	  bills.”64	  The	  book’s	  subtitle,	  “Winning	  on	  Budg-­‐ets	  and	  Losing	  on	  Policy,”	  somewhat	  puzzlingly	  discounts	  the	  authors’	  findings	  that	  governors	  often	  do	  win	  on	  policy,	  but	  it	  nevertheless	  highlights	  that	  governors	  are	  
                                                            	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  129.	  	   58.	  	   Id.	  at	  127-­‐29.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  129.	  	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  at	  125-­‐27.	  	   61.	  	   Id.	  at	  4-­‐5.	  	  	   62.	  	   Id.	  at	  97.	  	   63.	  	   Id.	  at	  214.	  	  	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	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the	  most	  successful	  when	  negotiating	  with	   legislators	  over	  the	  budget.65	  The	  chief	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  because	  in	  most	  states,	  failure	  to	  pass	  a	  budget	  “triggers	  an	  auto-­‐matic	  shutdown	  of	  the	  government.”66	  Given	  the	  negative	  political	  consequences	  of	  a	  government	  shutdown	  on	  legislators	  and	  the	  governor	  alike,	  the	  prospect	  of	  this	  political	  calamity	  forces	  both	  sides	  to	  the	  bargaining	  table.67	  Legislative	  inaction	  on	  the	  governor’s	  policy	  bills,	  by	  contrast,	  means	  “nothing	  too	  terrible	  happens.”68	  Ra-­‐ther	  than	  triggering	  an	  automatic	  government	  shutdown,	  all	  that	  happens	  when	  the	  legislature	  fails	  to	  enact	  one	  of	  the	  governors’	  policy	  bills	  is	  that	  it	  maintains	  the	  sta-­‐tus	  quo.69	  The	  authors	  also	  help	  explain	  why,	  rather	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  governors	  such	  as	  Louisiana	  Governor	  Kathleen	  Blanco	  and	  Governor	  Bob	  Taft	  in	  Ohio	  were	  able	  to	  achieve	  budgetary	  and	  policy	  successes	  even	  as	  their	  popularity	  among	  their	  state	  constituents	  collapsed.70	  By	  developing	  innovative	  “impact	  scores”	  that	  weigh	  vari-­‐ous	   proposals	   according	   to	   their	   overall	   policy	   impact,71	   the	   authors	   explain	   that	  unpopular	   governors	   like	   Blanco	   and	   Taft	  were	   able	   to	   secure	   successes	   because	  they	  acted	  strategically	  by	  scaling	  back	  their	  agendas	  to	  be	  far	  less	  ambitious.72	  The	  authors	  present	  numerous	  other	   interesting	   findings	  as	  well—indeed	  too	  many	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  in	  this	  short	  essay.	  The	  authors	  cover	  so	  much	  ground	  in	  this	  book	  that	  it	  is	  perhaps	  unfair	  to	  ex-­‐pect	  much	  more.	  That	  said,	  I	  was	  not	  entirely	  convinced	  by	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  dif-­‐fering	   dynamics	   underlying	   the	   governors’	   budget	   versus	   policy	   negotiations.	   On	  policy,	  they	  argue	  that	  governors	  face	  institutional	  constraints	  that	  limit	  their	  pow-­‐er.73	  To	  achieve	  policy	  success,	  governors	  must	  shape	  their	  policy	  proposals	  strate-­‐gically	  in	  light	  of	  institutional	  arrangements	  largely	  outside	  of	  their	  control,	  particu-­‐larly	   the	   ideological	   proclivities	   of	   the	   legislature.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   authors	   claim,	  governors	  have	  much	  more	  agency	  in	  developing	  their	  budget	  proposals.74	  Because	  the	   legislature	  must	   come	   to	   the	  negotiating	   table	   to	   pass	   a	   budget	   every	   year,	   it	  cannot	  ignore	  “unreasonable”	  gubernatorial	  proposals	  in	  the	  same	  way	  it	  can	  with	  policy.75	  “Simply	  put,	  governors	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  strategic	  when	  formulating	  their	  fiscal	  agendas.”76	  The	   assumption	   that	   governors	   enjoy	   nearly	   complete	   control	   over	   their	  budget	  proposals,	  however,	  overlooks	  how	  budgets	  are	  themselves	  institutions	  that	  shape	  the	  governor’s	  bargaining	  circumstances.	  When	  governors	  develop	  their	  an-­‐nual	   budget	   proposals,	   they	   do	   so	   based	   upon	   the	   existing	   structure	   of	   previous	  
                                                            	   65.	  	   Id.	  at	  115.	  	   66.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	  	   67.	  	   Id.	  	  	   68.	  	   Id.	  at	  30.	  	  	   69.	  	   Id.	  	  	   70.	  	   Id.	  at	  174-­‐86.	  	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  at	  111.	  	  	   72.	  	   Id.	  at	  186-­‐87.	  	   73.	  	   Id.	  at	  31-­‐33.	  	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  118.	  	  	   75.	  	   Id.	  at	  118.	  	  	  	   76.	  	   Id.	  at	  90.	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years’	  budgets—budgets	   that	   they	  may	  have	  had	  no	   control	   in	  developing.	  Devia-­‐tions	  from	  this	  existing	  structure	  are	  typically	  incremental	  rather	  than	  substantial,	  especially	  since	  existing	  budget	  programs	  already	  have	  built-­‐in	  constituencies	  will-­‐ing	  to	  defend	  the	  status	  quo.	  In	  this	  sense,	  budgets	  are	  similar	  to	  other	  durable	  in-­‐stitutions	  defined	  in	  part	  by	  their	  resistance	  to	  change.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  develop-­‐ing	   policy	   proposals,	   governors	  work	   from	   a	   cleaner	   slate	   than	   they	   do	  with	   the	  budget.	   Because	   they	   are	   not	  working	   off	   an	   existing	   template,	   governors	   appear	  freer	  to	  ask	  for	  their	  sincere	  preferences	  on	  policy	  rather	  than	  the	  budget.	  This	  dif-­‐ferent	   institutional	   dynamic	   would	   help	   explain	   the	   author’s	   initially	   surprising	  finding	   that	   Republican	   and	   Democratic	   governors	   tend	   to	   propose	   very	   similar	  budgets	  even	  as	  their	  policy	  proposals	  differ	  considerably.77	  While	  the	  authors	  sug-­‐gest	  that	  this	  reflects	  ideological	  flexibility	  on	  the	  part	  of	  governors,78	  it	  seems	  more	  likely	   that	   this	   is	  because	  governors’	  budget	  preferences	  are	   limited	  by	   the	   struc-­‐ture	  of	  the	  state	  budget	  already	  existing	  when	  they	  take	  office.	  The	  authors	  might	  have	  also	  placed	  more	  emphasis	  on	   the	  broader	   implica-­‐tions	  of	  their	  study.	  At	  several	  points	  in	  the	  book,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  conclusion,	  the	   authors	   suggest	   that	   the	   study	  of	   governors	   can	   teach	  us	  much	   about	  politics	  more	  broadly.79	  This	  is	  certainly	  correct,	  but	  the	  authors	  might	  have	  made	  more	  of	  this	  point.	  It	  is	  true,	  as	  they	  state,	  that	  scholars	  can	  benefit	  from	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  research	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  wide	  variation	  in	  the	  states.80	  This	  methodo-­‐logical	   focus,	   however,	   partially	   obscures	   one	   of	   the	   major	   substantive	   contribu-­‐tions	  of	  the	  book,	  which,	   like	  Ambar’s,	   illustrates	  that	  the	  study	  of	  the	  states’	  chief	  executives	   can	   reveal	  much	   about	   the	   exercise	   of	   executive	   power	   generally.	   For	  one,	  the	  book	  demonstrates	  that	  understanding	  executive	  power	  requires	  close	  ex-­‐amination	  of	  the	  broader	  institutional	  relationships	  in	  which	  it	  is	  situated.	  This	  fo-­‐cus	  on	  inter-­‐branch	  relationships	  parallels	  important	  works	  examining	  other	  insti-­‐tutions,	   such	   as	   studies	   of	   how	   judges	   and	   justices	   act	   strategically	   in	   reaction	   to	  other	   branches	   and	   how	   conflicts	   between	   the	   president	   and	   Congress	   generate	  new	   avenues	   for	   litigation	   to	   influence	   politics.81	   By	   placing	   their	   study	   in	   this	  broader	  context,	  and	  perhaps	  including	  a	  separate	  discussion	  of	  the	  broader	  nature	  of	   executive	   power	   and	   how	   gubernatorial	   power	   fits	   into	   it,	   the	   argument	   that	  scholars	  even	  outside	  of	  “state	  politics”	  ought	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  governors	  might	  have	  been	  made	  more	  explicit.	  These	  are	  relatively	  minor	  quibbles,	  however.	  Kousser	  and	  Phillips’s	  work	  is	  a	  major	  advance	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  gubernatorial	  power.	  This	  is	  due	  not	  only	  to	  
                                                            	   77.	  	   Id.	  at	  144,	  152.	  	  	   78.	  	   Id.	  at	  144.	  	  	   79.	  	   Id.	  256-­‐57.	  	  	   80.	  	   Id.	  at	  256.	  	   81.	  	   See	   generally	   JEB	   BARNES,	   DUST	   UP:	   ASBESTOS	   LITIGATION	   AND	   THE	   FAILURE	   OF	   COMMONSENSE	   POLICY	  REFORM	  (2011)	  (discussing	  the	   interactions	  among	  Congress,	   the	  President,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  re-­‐garding	  asbestos	  reform);	  LEE	  EPSTEIN	  &	  JACK	  KNIGHT,	  THE	  CHOICES	   JUSTICES	  MAKE	  (1998)	  (exploring	  how	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  are	  a	  result	  of	  strategic	   interactions	  among	  the	   Justices	  and	  between	   the	   Court	   and	   other	   branches	   of	   government);	   SEAN	   FARHANG,	   THE	   LITIGATION	   STATE:	   PUBLIC	  REGULATION	  AND	  PRIVATE	  LAWSUITS	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  (2010)	  (examining	  how	  the	  conflicts	  between	  leg-­‐islative	  and	  executive	  preferences	  encourages	  Congress	  to	  rely	  upon	  private	  litigation	  for	  statutory	  im-­‐plementation).	  
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/5
2013]	   GUBERNATORIAL	  POWER	   289	  
their	  impressive	  data	  collection	  but	  their	  recognition	  that	  understanding	  executive	  power	  means	  looking	  beyond	  its	  formal	  characteristics	  to	  examine	  how	  this	  power	  is	  embedded	  in	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  institutional	  relationships	  that	  help	  it	  expand	  and	  contract.	  	   *	  *	  *	  Some	   fifty	   years	   ago,	   Richard	   Neustadt	   famously	   noted	   that	   the	   American	  Constitution	  created	  not	  “separated	  powers,”	  but	  rather	  a	  system	  of	  “separated	  in-­‐stitutions	   sharing	   powers.”82	   While	   Neustadt’s	   formulation	   is	   widely	   quoted	   and	  seemingly	  accepted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  scholarly	  conventional	  wisdom,	  the	  study	  of	  poli-­‐tics	  nevertheless	  remains	  highly	   fragmented.	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Asso-­‐ciation,	  for	  example,	  by	  last	  count	  listed	  forty-­‐four	  separate	  organized	  sections	  such	  as	  “Legislative	  Studies,”	  “Presidents	  and	  Executive	  Politics,”	  and	  “State	  Politics	  and	  Policy.”83	   However	   practically	   necessary	   this	   scholarly	   separation	   might	   be,	   it	  threatens	  to	  obscure	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  how	  politics	  actually	  works.	  Politics	  between	  the	  levels	  of	  America’s	  federalist	  structure	  has	  become	  increasingly	  blend-­‐ed,	   driven	   by	   developments	   in	   national	   social	   policy,	   political	   party	   development,	  and	  the	  nationalization	  of	  issues,	  culture,	  and	  attitudes	  throughout	  America’s	  many	  jurisdictions.	  What	  happens	  in	  Vegas	  does	  not	  stay	  in	  Vegas,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  purpos-­‐es	  of	  contemporary	  American	  political	  development.	  This	  makes	  it	  all	  the	  more	  im-­‐portant	  for	  scholars	  across	  subfields	  to	  turn	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  states.	  By	  provid-­‐ing	   fresh	   perspectives	   on	   how	   governors	   exercise	   executive	   power,	   the	   books	   by	  Ambar	  and	  Kousser	  and	  Phillips	  help	  demonstrate	  the	  importance	  of	  state	  politics	  to	  the	  broader	  understanding	  of	  American	  politics.84	  	  
                                                            	   82.	  	   NEUSTADT,	  supra	  note	  39,	  at	  33.	  	   83.	  	   Organized	   Sections,	   AM.	   POL.	   SCI.	   ASS’N,	  http://www.apsanet.org/sections/index.cfm?CFID=21911048&CFTOKEN=70055392	   (last	   visited	   Dec.	  20,	  2013).	  	   84.	  	   See	  generally	  AMBAR,	  supra	  note	  5;	  KOUSSER	  &	  PHILLIPS,	  supra	  note	  6.	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